Does the "shaming" of human rights violations influence foreign aid delivery decisions across OECD donor countries? We examine the effect of shaming, defined as targeted negative attention by human rights international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), on donor decisions about how to deliver bilateral aid. We argue that INGO shaming of recipient countries leads donor governments, on average, to "bypass" the recipient government in favor of non-state aid delivery channels, including international and local NGOs and international organizations (IOs). However, we expect this relationship to be conditional on a donor country's position in the international system. Minor power countries have limited influence in global affairs and are therefore more able to centrally promote human rights in their foreign policy. Major power countries, on the other hand, shape world politics and often confront "realpolitik" concerns that may require government-to-government aid relations in the presence of INGO shaming. We expect aid officials of minor donor countries to be more likely to condition aid delivery decisions on human rights shaming than their counterparts of major donor countries. Using compositional data analysis, we test our argument using originally collected data on human rights shaming events in a time-series cross-sectional framework from 2004 to 2010. We find support for our hypotheses: On average, OECD donor governments increase the proportion of bypass when INGOs shame the recipient government. When differentiating between donor types we find that this finding holds for minor but not for major powers. These results add to both our understanding of the influences of aid allocation decision-making and our understanding of the role of INGOs on foreign-policy.
Introduction
Scholarship has long recognized that foreign aid serves as an instrument of state-craft, used to promote varied donor countries' foreign policy goals, including for instance, international security, commerce, international cooperation, and democratic change. 1 Among scholars interested in the nexus between foreign and human rights, however, a long standing debate continues over whether donor governments use foreign aid to sanction government-led repression in aid-receiving countries (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Alesina and Dollar, 1992; Apodaca and Stohl, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Rioux and Belle, 2005; Neumayer, 2003a,b; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009; Nielsen, 2013) . Some argue that donor governments prioritize geostrategic or economic considerations over human rights, making it unlikely that aid officials will systematically punish recipient governments for human rights violations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003a,b) . Others find that donor governments sanction human rights violations with reductions in foreign aid, although cuts are limited to specific aid types and sectors (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009; Nielsen, 2013) . 2 This paper strengthens our knowledge on the link between human rights and foreign aid policy by developing and testing a model of foreign aid delivery that identifies human rights international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as an influential force in foreign aid decision making. INGOs influence aid decision-making through their "shaming and blaming" campaigns. This negative publicity influences INGO members' and ordinary citizens' views about the country. Once citizens demand sanctions and generate pressure from below, INGOs have created direct incentives for aid officials to change aid policy. Even if citizens did not pay much attention to the negative publicity, INGO shaming would nonetheless create direct incentives for policy-makers to act with the public's presumed opinion in mind, as long as the probability of information being revealed to the public 1 Examples of studies that examine the link between aid and these different foreign policy objectives include Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), Bapat (2011) , Vreeland and Dreher (2014) , and Dietrich and Wright (2015) , respectively.
2 Cingarelli and Pasquarello (1985) show that the U.S. cuts economic but not military aid support to countries with human rights violations. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find that donor governments pressure international organizations to sanction repressive behavior with cuts in multilateral aid, while bilateral aid flows between donors and the repressive recipient government remain unchanged. Nielsen (2013) disaggregates bilateral aid into its various sectors, showing that human rights violations lead donor governments to cut economic aid but not humanitarian aid. The latter two findings by Lebovic and Voeten (2009) and Nielsen (2013) make important contributions to the literature as they disaggregate aid and are based on a more nuanced understanding of the decision-making process. Both works theorize and test for important heterogeneity within foreign aid.
and of the public reacting negatively to it is sufficiently high.
However, not all foreign officials are equally responsive to pressure from public opinion. That is, the expected value of changing aid delivery in response to INGO shaming is not the same across all donor governments. The position of the donor government in the international system conditions the effect of INGO shaming. Minor power donor governments have limited influence in world politics and are therefore able to centrally promote human rights in their foreign policy.
Major power donor governments, on the other hand, shape global affairs and are more likely to be more guided by "realpolitik" concerns, which often trump human rights. Our argument is thus conditional in nature and we expect INGO shaming to have a greater influence on aid policy in minor but not major power donor countries. This paper focuses on donor decisions about how to deliver bilateral aid abroad. As INGOs increase their shaming activities about government repression, officials are more likely to sanction the recipient government by channelling bilateral aid through non-state actors, including local and international NGOs, multilateral organizations, 3 and private companies. Indeed, the decision of donors to "bypass" the recipient public sector with foreign aid is significant. In 2007 OECD governments delegated over 30 percent (approximately US$ 41 billion) of their bilateral aid to non-state development actors (OECD 2012 , Dietrich 2013 . 4 We test our arguments using a global statistical model of all aid recipients and OECD donor governments from 2004 to 2010. Consistent with our argument, we find that, on average, INGO shaming increases the proportion of aid delivered through bypass, controlling for confounding covariates. We also find support that the relationship is conditional on donor type, as our results suggest that INGO shaming increases bypass more among minor than among major donor countries.
We contribute to the foreign aid and human rights literatures in three ways: First, we strengthen a burgeoning literature that studies the determinants of bilateral aid delivery decisions. 5 Second, we introduce international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as important champions of human rights in the foreign aid decision-making process. 6 Third, we account for important heterogeneity among donor governments, and show how the size of the donor country interacts with INGO shaming in the recipient country in influencing foreign aid decisions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the subsequent section, we develop our argument and present the hypotheses. Next, we present our research design, followed by our statistical tests and results. We conclude the paper by addressing how this project informs our larger theoretical understanding of the role of non-state actors in aid policy.
The Influence of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Aid Delivery Tactics
Human rights advocacy scholarship rests on the idea that it takes advocacy actors to publicize human rights violations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999) . International human rights advocacy INGOs, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, serve as key conduits of "shaming and blaming" in the international press (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005; Franklin, 2008; Murdie and Davis, 2012) . Human rights INGOs gather information, issue press releases, contact journalists. The information they gather and share can make it into media abroad. Through this media attention, they start the process through which other states and intergovernmental organizations begin to pressure a state to improve its human rights performance from abroad (Brysk, 1993; Keck and Sikkink, 1998) . These shaming campaigns, along with other INGO resources, are often concentrated in the most difficult cases, where domestic pressure for human rights may be limited and institutional structures in support of human rights are not available (Murdie and Urpelainen, 2015; Barry et al., 2015) . Additionally, shaming campaigns are more concentrated in states with more human rights abuses and in states that are likely to receive more global attention (Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005) .
One mechanism by which INGO "shaming and blaming" campaigns can induce policy change is by influencing public opinion on human rights conditions (Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz, 2012; Ausderan, 2014) . Recent research has found that shaming reports alone, even without changes zations. See Eichenauer and Knack (2014) and Bryant (2015) for examplary work.
in actual human rights conditions, is associated with changes in public opinion (Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz, 2012; Ausderan, 2014) . Further, according to recent World Value Survey reports, ordinary citizens are more confident of NGOs than of their government or the media. This is particularly true for wealthy OECD countries, 7 where citizens delegate the analysis of information to trusted actors (Downs 1957, 203-34) . Such high levels of public confidence in NGOs bodes well for their influencing of policy through the bottom-up, as the explicit shaming event is likely to have quite an impact on the public.
Through "shaming and blaming" INGOs seek to change public opinion on human rights conditions. This tactic is almost always associated with a call for action, and targets both the INGO membership base 8 and the general public. INGOs can create pressure on aid officials through the channel of public opinion in two ways: First, and upon reading and learning about human rights atrocities committed by far-way repressive governments, concerned citizens may directly reach out to their member of parliament to request punishment of human rights violations. The parliamentarian, in turn, will relay this request to the respective parliamentary committee, which in turns makes direct recommendations to aid officials to sanction the repressive government. Second, even if citizens do not pay much attention to the INGO shaming and blaming, aid officials will be influenced by INGO shaming as they act with the public's presumed opinion in mind. INGOs thus generate incentives for aid officials to change aid policy. The emerging political imperative to act was illustrated by a Swedish government official during an author interview: "When news about human rights violations make headlines in our national paper we certainly discuss whether we should change our interactions with the partner country. When NGOs take additional steps to go after dictators in our national newspaper we feel direct pressure to act. At this point we consult with them directly on how to best move forward given conditions in the country." 9 As illustrated by the interview anecdote, negative publicity in national news, underwritten by NGOs as credible agents, motivates public opinion. As research by Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) suggests, information disseminated through news channels on a "per-story" basis is more successful at chaning public opinion in the short-run than other information spread through other sources. We add that 7 Please see Murdie and Peksen (2014, 218) for a discussion of these World Values Survey findings. 8 See Murdie and Davis (2012) and Hendrix and Wong (2013) for examples of this mechanism. 9 Author Interview with Senior Government Official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, June 18, 2013. news-driven calls for action, as in the case of "shaming and blaming" events, creates strong policy imperatives for immediate action to signal responsiveness.
Though much scholarship has studied aid officials' decision to reduce overall levels of bilateral aid, our argument focuses on aid decision-making regarding the delivery of foreign aid. We claim that the decision to bypass shamed governments, while channeling aid through non-state development actors, represents a more targeted sanctioning mechanism that allows resources to continue to flow into the country to promote other important goals such as development. Since INGO "shaming and blaming" usually focuses on the abuse of government power, donor sanctions should target the culprit directly. Mere reductions in overall aid, on the other hand, are likely to negatively affect the wider population in need of assistance. 10
Drawing on findings from several foreign aid opinion polls of different donor countries, we posit that citizens will interpret donor government's decision to bypass "shamed" aid-receiving governments as strong indicator of government responsiveness to changes in their attitudes. As is the case across many donor countries, ordinary citizens often prefer bypass tactics in foreign aid. Data from countries as diverse as Canada (CIDA, 2004) , France (AFD, 2011), and Sweden (Bandstein, 2007) indicate that ordinary citizens support aid for development and humanitarian purposes but they are less supportive of aid that promotes non-developmental goals. Second, citizens in many countries show greater baseline support for bypass aid than for government-togovernment aid. This suggests that citizens not only understand that aid modalities vary but that bypass implies a potential tactic to sanction bad government behavior.
These insights combined suggest that INGO "shaming and blaming" motivates changes in public opinion that influence how foreign aid is delivered. Once shaming has occurred publics can directly articulate their preferences for bypass to their government representatives. Even if the public were unable to lobby systematically, aid officials still have incentives to directly act upon shaming with the public's (presumed) opinion and preferences in mind. This logic has the following 10 It is important to note that we do not expect that the entire foreign aid budget earmarked for the public sector in any given year will be shifted towards non-state actors. Many collaborative donor-recipient projects have a multi-year time frame and are implemented with the involvement of donor agencies. While many of these projects may be more difficult to reorient in terms of delivery method, more programmatic and budget-oriented funding can more easily be redirected to alternative delivery agents. However, according to extensive author interviews with more than 70 aid decision-makers across OECD donor countries, aid officials have the power to freeze or withhold significant funding even for multi-year projects if deemed necessary, which may be in the face of unexpected anti-democratic behavior or corruption.
empirical implication:
Hypothesis 1: INGO "shaming and blaming" tactics that generate negative publicity about the aid-receiving government will increase the share of bilateral aid delivered through non-state development channels.
Which Donors are Influenced by INGO Shaming?
There is a large comparative literature on the differences in the importance of human rights concerns in the various foreign policies of states (Carleton and Stohl, 1985; Baehr and CastermansHolleman, 1994; Brysk, 2009; Perkins and Neumayer, 2010) . Drawing on this literature, we argue that foreign aid decision-making is shaped, in part, by the position of the state in the international system. While small or minor power states have limited influence in world politics, major power states are in dominant positions of influence that shape critical global issues such as trade and international security, among other important policy areas. While officials of major power states like the United States rhetorically promote human rights concerns as key foreign policy issues, scholars have long recognized that statesmen are guided by "realpolitik" concerns. As Morgenthau claims there may be "other interests that may be more important than the defense of human rights in a particular circumstance" (Morgenthau, 1979, 7) . 11 It is minor power states like Sweden or the Netherlands that are cited for making human rights central in their foreign policy (Baehr, Castermans-Holleman and Grünfeld, 2002; Brysk, 2009 ).
We argue that aid officials from major power donor countries, compared to their counterparts in minor power states, are more likely to encounter instances in aid decision-making when the promotion of human rights may conflict with, or be overshadowed by geostrategic or commercerelated goals, among others. For example, if a major power donor government seeks to promote peace and security in a region, and if that peace is more likely to be guaranteed by a repressive government, then donor officials have incentives to prop up the regime. 12 This preference for regime stability, in turn, may run counter to the goal of promoting human rights, and thus mitigate the 11 Other studies that suggest lack of responsiveness among major power states include Carleton and Stohl (1985) and Perkins and Neumayer (2010) .
12 Aid to government channels may be seen as a way to prop up a regime that is having to use repression in the face of increasing domestic opposition (Escribà-Folch, 2010; Licht, 2010; Ritter, 2014 Congressional leaders and government officials have traditionally favored the promotion of leader stability through continued government-to-government assistance to the president (Berger, 2012) .
Although the regime's violent repression of anti-government protest in 2013 generated substantial negative publicity in the media and caused a majority of Americans to advocate for sanctions, the United States did not change their aid policy in a significant way. The U.S. government's preference for regime stability triumphed over the promotion of human rights. The same logic was raised in the context of discussions about Germany's bilateral development cooperation with Ethiopia, a recipient government that has increased its repression of citizens and has been the target of shaming campaigns and human rights reporting. 13 In 2012, increasing negative publicity prompted the deputy chairman of the German parliament's committee to claim that "if a country's human rights record is deteriorating as is the case in Ethiopia, then the German government needs to assess whether development aid to that country is essential or not. I personally would only agree to pay out the cash once there has been significant improvement in human rights" (Schadomsky 2012, 1). Rather than pulling out altogether, however, further requests were made that "we [Germany, added by authors] can try to open the door to liberalization in the country, and to promote Ethiopia's private sector" (Schadomsky 2012, 1) by channeling aid through non-state actors. Critics, however, were quick to suggest that Ethiopia's government will "most certainly receive the money, because of its importance for Germany's strategic and economic interests on the horn of Africa" (Schadomsky 2012, 1). So far, contributions have not significantly, though marginally, shifted from government-to-government support to bypass in 2014 (OECD CRS 2015).
We thus expect that our argument about the influence of INGO shaming on foreign aid delivery is conditional on the position of donor countries in the international system. Major and minor power countries differ from each other in their exposure to and influence in world politics. If exposure and influence are high, as is the case for major power countries, donor officials are more constrained by "realpolitik" concerns and are thus not likely to systematically respond to INGO shaming campaigns. If we estimated the effect of shaming on a sample of only minor powers, This This hypothesis implies that we would expect shaming to be significanty different from zero when the analyses are estimated on a sample of minor powers only. The effect of shaming should be insignificant when we estimate analysis only on a sample of major powers. It may be, too, that more limited influence in world politics leads minor donors to respond differently to shaming than major power donors. For instance, the counterveiling forces of "realpolitik" may cause major power donor governments to respond with less bypass aid than minor donor countries. This suggests what we would expect the effect of shaming for minor powers to be positive and in its size systematically different from major powers. This has the following empirical implication.
Hypothesis 3: In response to shaming minor power donor countries will give significantly more bypass aid than major powers.
Research Design, Data and Measures
We explain variation in bypass tactics across 23 OECD donor countries to their recipients. The universe of recipient countries includes ODA eligible countries as defined by the OECD (including low, lower middle and upper middle income countries). We test our argument at the level of the donor-recipient dyad-year. Our temporal domain ranges from 2004 to 2010.
The dependent variable: aid delivery through non-state channels
The outcome of interest is donor decisions to deliver bilateral aid through non-state development actors. To construct a measure of bypass, we use data drawn from the OECD CRS aid activity database. Information on the channel of delivery conveys how foreign aid is delivered: it records the amount of bilateral aid flows channeled through five channel categories. These include government-to-government aid as well as aid delivered to non-governmental organizations, international organizations (IOs), and other development actors. The OECD began collecting information on the "channel of delivery" in 2004. Early years exhibit greater portions of data missingness than later years because the introduction of the new data item required new data collection procedures from donor governments (Aidinfo 2008, p. 16) . In our main analyses we only include dyad-year observations for which at least 90 percent of the aid flows are accounted for by a channel of delivery category. 14 In our empirical analyses we use a broad bypass measure that distinguishes between governmentto-government aid and aid channeled through non-state development actors. We define governmentto-government aid as any aid activity that involves the recipient government as an implementing partner. We define as bypass any aid transaction that delegates control over implementation to non-state actors. The primary bypass channels include NGOs and IOs. We operationalize the decision to bypass with a continuous measure, capturing the proportion of aid delivered through non-state development actors. 
Controls
As the previous literature on aid policy maintains, other factors shape donor decision-making, including other human-rights related recipient characteristics and non-developmental donor goals.
We include them as controls to provide a fully specified model. All time-varying right-hand side variables are lagged one year. We begin with the confounding effects of observable human rights violations. We use an ordinal scale of physical integrity rights performance from the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) Human Rights Dataset to construct Physical Integrity Rights. This measure, which ranges from 0, indicating no respect for physical integrity rights, to 8, indicating full respect for physical integrity rights, captures governmental performance on four key physical integrity rights: freedom from torture, extra-judicial or political killings, political imprisonment, and disappearances. The measure is based on state-level U.S. State Department and Amnesty International annual reports of governmental human rights practices towards citizens of that state. Kiribati, for example, has the index's highest value for government respect of physical integrity rights for the entire temporal range of our sample while North Korea, for example, takes the lowest value of government respect for physical integrity rights for the entire time period. We include this indicator, lagged one year, for the recipient countries in the dyad in all statistical models.
We also control for the confounding effects of governance quality in the recipient country. As research by Dietrich (2013) finds, donor governments pay attention to risk of aid capture in aidreceiving countries. Weak state institutions and high levels of corruption increase the risk associated with the delivery of aid to beneficiaries abroad. In response to low governance quality, donor officials increase the proportion of aid that bypasses the recipient government to avoid aid capture. To capture the quality of governance we draw on data from the Governance Matters project (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2012) . Our governance measure, Quality of Governance captures a state's economic institutions by including corruption control, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law as indicators. The values of the measure range between 0 to 5, with higher values representing a higher quality of governance.
We also include Democracy. Donors may conceive of democratic institutions as political constraints that exercise constraints on the ability of the public sector in recipient countries to capture aid flows. Democracy is measured using the combined score of the Freedom House (2012) civil liberty and political rights indicators. To make the scale of the measure more intuitive we invert Democracy so that "1" represents the lowest level of democracy, while "7" stands for the highest level of democracy. The Freedom House data are widely used among donor governments in their assessments of democracy. During interviews with donor officials across OECD donor countries this measure was most often mentioned as informing assessments of political regimes.
We control for the natural log of Disaster Deaths. A greater number of natural disaster related deaths in the aid recipient, as recorded by the EM-DAT database, may encourage donors to provide a larger share of the foreign aid pie to NGOs actors that are specialized in disaster efforts. We further control for low-scale Civil Conflict, as recorded by the PRIO database (Gleditsch and Strand, 2002) . Domestic conflict may create grievances that provide incentives for donors to favor more outcome-orientated aid delivery through NGOs to ensure that aid reaches the affected, thus increasing donor propensity to bypass through NGOs.
We further include Distance to account for the geographical proximity between donor and the aid-receiving countries. We expect that, as distance between donors and aid-receiving countries grows, government-to-government relations between donor and recipient governments are expected to weaken, thus increasing donor propensity to channel aid through non-state development actors.
The distance data come from the Eugene software. The data measure distance between capitals in miles. The measures are logged (Bennett and Stam, 2000) . We further control for Former Colony status, as recorded by the CIA World Factbook. The data capture whether the recipient country was a former colony of the donor country in the dyad pair. This allows us to account for long-lasting diplomatic ties between the donor and the aid receiving governments that may bias aid delivery in favor of government-to-government aid.
To control for existing economic ties between donor and recipient country, we include Trade Intensity, measured as the logged sum of imports and exports between the recipient and the OECD countries by the IMF-DOT database. We also control for security related donor goals by including Security Council, which is a binary variable indicating whether the aid recipient is a temporary member on the UN Security Council. As studies by Kuziemko and Werker (2009) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014) find, donor governments may employ aid to buy votes from rotating members of the UN Security Council. We also include a logged measure for population size, Population in the aid-receiving country, since our dependent variable is a count. We expect recipients with larger populations to be more likely to be shamed by INGOs. Finally, we add a control for the natural log of the total amount of aid delivered per capita from one donor to its recipient in any given year, Total per Capita Aid Flows, which comes for the OECD CRS database. We control for this variable because we expect that, as the volume of aid increases donors are more likely to pursue strategic goals with the aid as well, which would require government-to-government collaboration, which in turn would decrease the proportion of bypass.
Analysis and Results
We now estimate two models that analyze the effect of human rights INGO shaming on foreign aid delivery. One estimates the average effect of INGO shaming across all donors. The other model estimates the effect conditional on a donor country's position in the international system. For both models we fit a linear OLS model with a log-transformed dependent variable to account for the proportional nature of our bypass variable. Before specifying the estimating equations we first provide a brief discussion of the statistical implications of using a proportional outcome measure, which requires compositional data analysis.
Compositional data analysis 15
For any donor-recipient dyad the aid channel share is positive and the sum of the aid channels shares must be one hundred percent. Consider the aid share A, in donor-recipient dyad i for channel j. The compositional nature of the variable is expressed by the constraints that the fraction of the aid share that government-to-government or bypass channels might receive is doubly bounded, falling between 0 and 1,
with A i,j denoting the fraction of the aid in donor-recipient dyad i (i=1, ..., N) for delivery channel j (j=1, J). Government-to-government aid and bypass aid in a given donor-recipient dyad sums to unity,
where J is the total number of delivery channels, which equal two (government-to-government and non-state aid) in our case.
Following Aitchison (1986), we create a (J − 1) log aid ratio, which compares the bypass aid to government-to-government aid:
15 We draw on Dietrich (2013) for notation.
The advantage of log transforming proportional outcomes is that the outcome is unconstrained, allowing for a straightforward estimation through OLS. The coefficient of the log-transformed bypass share variable then describes how the log ratio of bypass aid changes with respect to government-to-government aid. After modeling, the estimates are transformed back into their original scale of interest:
and Y is log-transformed following the steps (1) through (4) above.
Estimating equation
Our first model analyzes the average effects of INGO shaming across all donors. Robust standard errors are clustered on the dyad. 16 Across the analyses we include year, donor, and recipient country fixed effects. The subsequent equation describes the specified statistical model:
where i = dyad-varying, r = recipient-varying, and t = time-varying. V= variables that vary at the dyadic level over time and Z = variables that vary at the recipient level over time. Y = donor fixed effects, X = recipient fixed effects, and W = time fixed effects.
Second, we re-estimate the model on two separate samples to account for heterogeneity among donor countries. As hypothesized above, we expect that minor power donor governments are more likely than their major power counterparts to respond to shaming. To test this specific hypothesis we first separate donors into major or minor donor types through a dichotomous variable, Minor Donor, that is coded "1" for minor power status, and "0" for major power status. We code the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, as major and the remaining OECD donor governments as minor powers.
When comparing the coefficients of our subsample analyses based on tests using a seeminglyunrelated regression framework, resulting chow test statistics indicate that, in the aggregate, the coefficients from minor and major power donor samples are statistically different from one another.
16 The results are robust to alternative cluster specifications on the recipient country and the donor country.
This finding suggests that the variables in our model have different effects in the subsamples. It also suggests that different factors motivate the foreign aid delivery decisions from minor and major power donors. We further explored differences between donor types and found that major donor governments, on average, provide bilateral aid for more than 113 recipient countries in our sample, while minor power countries send assistance to 92 on average.
Nonetheless, in a third step, we interact the Minor Donor indicator with our INGO shaming variable in a full donor sample to assess if minor and major powers respond differently to shaming;
i.e., whether minor powers respond more to shaming than major powers. In doing so we claim that 
17 For example, we should expect differential effects for distance. Minor power donor governments have less reach and less capacity to implement their own projects. As distance increases we should expect minor powers to decrease bypass and channel more aid through the government-to-government channel. For major powers we might not expect there to be as strong as an effect, perhaps we even expect the opposite outcome.
18 Again, the results are robust to alternative cluster specifications.
Across our specifications we identified autocorrelation when using the Wooldridge test for panel data (Wooldridge 2002, 282-283) . To address autocorrelation researchers typically include a lagged dependent variable. However, in light of the limited temporal domain of a our data and the inclusion of three-way fixed effects we acknowledge statistical concerns related to Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981) . We opt to estimate models without lagged dependent variables in the main manuscript.
For robustness we estimate a series of models that include the lagged dependent variable in the appendix. 19 The results are robust to including a lagged dependent variable.
Results
In Tables 1 through 4 we present our main findings. Our argument suggests that, on average, donor governments are responsive to INGO shaming reports insofar as an increase in shaming will increase the proportion of bypass aid abroad. However, we expect this relationship to be conditional on donor type: we expect our shaming variable to have a stronger positive effect on bypass for minor power donor countries. We find statistical support for these hypotheses.
We begin by discussing the average effects of INGO shaming across all donors. The first column of news count, which we include to account for any media bias towards the recipient country. We also add a logged variable that captures total aid per capita flows within a donor-recipient pair in a given year. The coefficient of INGO Shaming is positive and highly significant. In Table   1 , Model 2 we show the results of more fully specified models which include the entire set of control variables discussed earlier. Again, the human rights INGO shaming variable is positively and statistically significantly associated with bypass. This provides evidence that, on average, "shaming and blaming" through human rights INGOs directly affects donor governments' decision 19 The Appendix is available on the Review of International Organization's webpage. 20 Given our short time span and small within-unit sample sizes we opt for the inclusion of donor and recipient fixed effects instead of dyad fixed effects. If the within unit sample size is small, the unit effects alone may account for most of the variation in our bypass variable. What is more there are time-invariant dyadic variables in the specification that are very important to include in the model, including distance. If we included dyadic fixed effects this control would drop out as it is perfectly collinear with the set of unit dummy variables. This makes it impossible to estimate the unique effects of that variable. We nonetheless estimated the model using dyad fixed effects and the shaming coefficient (with a p-value of 0.108) just misses conventional levels of statistical significance.
to bypass across the entire sample of OECD donor countries.
[insert Table 1 here] To ensure the robustness of this finding, we conduct additional estimations on alternative dependent variables. First, we address the concern that human rights shaming might influence different aid sectors differentially. For instance, human rights shaming might influence economic aid but not social aid, as we learn from Nielsen (2013) . We therefore tested our theory at a more disaggregated level. We created two bypass variables, one for economic aid and another one for social sector aid. We regressed each independently on our set of right hand side covariates. In Table 1 Second, we address the potential concern that human rights INGO shaming may more quickly induce changes in absolute levels of government-to-government aid, such as, for instance, budget support, but not in levels of aid to non-state actors which may take more time to limit due to multiyear roll-out contracts. This would suggest that changes in the proportion of aid may be merely a function of changes in government-to-government but not bypass aid. 22 We estimated a model with levels of government-to-government aid as the dependent variable. 23 The model includes the same battery of control variables. It also includes the three-way fixed effects specifications. In Table   1 Model 5 we present the results. We find that human rights INGO shaming has no systematic influence on levels of government-to-government aid. In further tests we show that shaming is not associated with overall levels of aid, which suggests that donor governments do not change 21 We present the results in the appendix Table 1 , Models 1 through 4. 22 We thank the editor and one anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 23 The sample is slightly bigger as it excludes the Total Aid Per Capita measure. This measure captures per capita levels of foreign aid that flow between donor and recipient pair given that at least 90 percent of the channel of delivery data was reported to the OECD CRS.
overall levels of foreign aid in response to shaming events. We do find, however, that shaming is associated with increased levels of bypass aid. This additional evidence suggests that aid officials thinks systematically about foreign aid delivery and use bypass delivery channels selectively. 24 In light of these statistical findings, we proceed to explore the substantive effects of human rights INGO shaming on aid delivery. How large is the aggregate donor response to human rights INGO shaming activities? We compute predictive margins of donor responses, varying the count of human rights INGO shaming activities on the basis of estimations conducted for the results in Table 1 Model 3. The average bypass share of 56 percent increases to 60 percent if the country gets shamed once by a human rights INGO in any given year. The average bypass share increases to 60 percent if the country gets shamed two times in any given year. It increases to 63 percent if the aid-receiving country is shamed three times by an INGO. We consider these effects quite sizeable given that we are assessing the influence of INGOs on a government's decision-making process.
Importantly, our argument presumes that donors always have a choice between two viable channel options, the government-to-government and bypass channels. However, in some countries recipient governments often lack functional competence or may not even formally exist. In such environments bypass may be the only option for donors. To account for this possibility, we reestimate Table 1 We present further evidence for the robustness of our findings in Table 2 . Recent work by Felbermayr and Groeschl (2014) shows that the EM-DAT natural disaster data are correlated with a country's GDP. In Model 1, we therefore use levels of humanitarian aid as a proxy for natural disaster related damages to a country. 26 We re-estimate our fully specified model but replace our control for logged natural disaster deaths with the logged amout of humanitarian aid that is 24 Table 2 in the appendix presents further tests that explore the effects of INGO Shaming on levels of social and economic sector aid. Again, INGO Shaming is not systematically associated with levels of aid.
25 Table 3 in the appendix presents the results for the INGO coefficients from three different samples that exclude the top 10, top 15, and top 20 most fragile states in the international system. The model specifications include ones with and ones without the lagged dependent variable. The size of the coefficients are increasing in size as the estimation sample becomes more limited to include only aid-receiving countries with functionally competent governments. 26 We thank one anonymous reviewer for raising this issue and suggesting the alternative proxy.
delivered to a recipient by a given donor in a year. The results remain robust to the inclusion of humanitarian aid in lieu of EM-DAT-based disaster deaths.
[insert Table 2 of INGOs in donor and aid-receiving countries in any given year. We log and lag these variables in our estimations. Table 2 Model 3 includes the count of INGOs in recipient countries. Table 2 Model 4 includes the count of INGOs in donor countries. The main results are robust to including these two variables.
In a next step, we present findings from the second set of estimations, which tests our hypotheses about heterogeneity across donors and its effect on foreign aid delivery. Our first hypothesis states that officials of minor power donor countries are more responsive to INGO shaming than major power countries. As indicated above, we are testing this hypothesis in a split sample framework.
We choose to do so because statistical tests that compare the coefficients of the minor and major donor samples suggest that they are statistically different from one another. We conclude that variables in our model have different effects in the subsamples and that aid officials from minor and major power donors respond to different factors. Further tests for differences in factors that drive foreign aid delivery decision-making between donor types we find that major donors give aid to 113 recipient countries, on average, while minor power countries send assistance to 92 on average. include basic specifications on the basis of minor and major donor country samples, Models 2 and 4 present findings from the more fully specified models, which account for the potential alternative explanations of globalization and direct civil society pressure. Across all models we include a three-way fixed effects specification and cluster our standard errors on the donor-recipient pair.
According to our argument we expect to see a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Models 1 and 2, where we focus on minor donors. We find support in both models. The "INGO Shaming" coefficient remains statistically insignificant in Models 3 and 4, which are estimated on a sample of major powers. We interpret these results as evidence that donors vary in the extent to which they respond to INGO shaming: while minor power governments systematically re-orient aid delivery towards non-state actors, major power donor governments do not exhibit systematic patterns of this behavior. 27
[insert Table 3 here] Our findings hold across a variety of additional robustness tests. For instance, we re-estimate our models controlling for UNGA Voting Similarity between any of our dyads. The results are robust to the inclusion of the affinity measure. 28 Also we re-estimate our main models using related, though conceptually distinct measures from INGO shaming. For instance, our results continue 27 We re-estimate the model using a seemingly-unrelated regression framework. The results are very similar to the independent subsample analysis and are presented in Table 9 of the appendix. 28 We thank one anonymous reviewer suggestion and present the findings in Table 8 in the appendix.
to hold when controlling for the overall logged number of background reports and press releases from Amnesty International, as employed by Ron, Ramos and Rodgers (2005) . We also re-estimate our model using Nielsen's (2013) logged general measure of human rights attention, the log of total number of human rights stories about a country in the New York Times. Again, our INGO shaming variable remains positive and statistically significant. This finding provides further support of our argument suggesting not only that INGOs are a trusted source of information among the public and that mere human rights stories are not equivalent to the role of human rights INGO shaming.
29 Finally, we also conduct additional robustness tests using GLM as an alternative estimator. The results remain robust. 30
Subsequently, we test our third hypothesis about the differential effects of human rights INGO shaming on aid delivery for minor and major power donor governments using an interaction model that pools both donor types. We expect officials of minor power donor countries to bypass more than officials from major power donors in response to shaming. For this to be true we would expect to find a significant Minor Donor*INGO Shaming interaction term. Table 3 presents the findings. 31
Model 1 offers results from a basic specification, while Model 2 offers findings from a more fully specified model that present the main interaction term alongside the full set of control variables interacted with Minor Donor. Both models also include year and recipient country fixed effects, with standard errors clustered on the donor-recipient pair.
As the findings of Table 4 indicate the interaction term is insignificant in both models. This suggests that we do not find evidence for our third hypothesis which tests the expectation that minor power donor governments respond more to shaming than major power governments. Although results from earlier subsample analyses show that minor donors are more likely to respond to shaming than major power donors, we do not find that shaming leads to higher proportions in bypass among minor than major power donors. We posit that this lack of evidence likely results from large variance of the effect of shaming in major power donors, as indicated in the large standard errors of shaming in the major power donor sample. 29 We present the results of these estimations on a full sample as well as the minor and major power samples separately in Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix. 30 Tables 6 and 7 in the appendix show the results. 31 Since we should expect major and minor powers to respond differently to at least some confounders we include the controls in interaction with Minor Donor.
[insert Table 4 here] To further probe into the lack of statistical significance of the interaction term we conducted further tests in our subsamples. That is, we re-estimated our subsample models presented Table 3 and included donor-year fixed effects. It could be that the impact of various foreign policy concerns (other than human rights) may vary year to year. It may be for instance, that, in one year, domestic unrest in one country that has spill-over potential into national security may focus major government's attention on global security, which might bias aid delivery in favor of more government to government assistance to strengthen a state's military capacity. Alternatively, international economic shocks in other years may require major countries to shift their priorities to helping with global economic recovery. Therefore, unless we can include every facet of these year-to-year factors, the major power shaming coefficient will pick up some of that variation, which may explain its sizeable standard error and the insignificant coefficient. Although the inclusion of donor year fixed effects reduces some of the uncertainty around our shaming coefficient estimates in the major power sample, the coefficient remains statistically significant at conventional levels. In the minor power sample, however, we find that the shaming coefficient remains statistically significant controlling for donor-year fixed effects. Once again, this suggests that minor power donor governments are less motivated by global strategy and can focus more on the promotion of human rights policy.
Implications and Conclusion
This study developed and tested a model that links INGO human rights shaming tactics to foreign aid delivery decisions, while accounting for heterogeneity among donor countries. We argue that human rights INGOs create pressure on foreign aid officials via the channel of public opinion.
Through targeted "shaming and blaming" campaigns INGOs mobilize their own membership base as well as the larger public in donor countries to demand from their parliamentary representatives that repressive government be sanctioned. Once lobbied by their constituents, members of parliament relay their citizens' concerns to aid officials, which creates pressure to act. In response, aid officials will sanction repressive governments by increasing the proportion of bilateral aid that is channeled through non-state development actors abroad. At the same time, we argue that not all donor governments are equally responsive to direct pressure through INGO shaming. Relative to minor power donors, major power donors are heavily involved in shaping global affairs and are thus more likely to face countervailing security or commercial pressures that demand a continuation of government-to-government aid relations in the face of INGO shaming. We find statistical support for our predictions.
Our findings convey that human rights INGOs, through targeted "shaming and blaming" campaigns can shape foreign aid delivery. Through "shaming and blaming" INGOs influence public opinion and, through the bottom up, create direct incentives for aid officials to change the mechanism of aid delivery in ways that sanctions the repressive government yet still provides aid in ways that can promote development through alternative, non-state development actors. This finding dovetails with emerging research on the influence of INGOs on foreign policy decision-making more broadly (Barry, Clay and Flynn, 2013; Peksen, 2013, 2014) .
We also find that INGO influence varies by the donor country's position in the international system. INGO shaming is more likely to systematically influence aid officials from minor power donor countries than major power ones, whose countries have more limited influence in world politics and where INGO-generated pressure from below is sidelined through "realpolitik" concerns. not who can thus make human rights a central tenet in their foreign policy. This finding is consistent with extant research finding that acknowledge difficulties associated with enforcing human rights abroad as donor governments reward recipients for economic, historical, political, and/or military relevance; and that show that influential countries like the United States, despite rhetoric to the contrary, has not used foreign aid systematically to sanction repression abroad (Carleton and Stohl, 1985; Perkins and Neumayer, 2010 Table 8 : Controlling for UNGA Voting Similarity, using the "s3un" measure. +p = 0.11, * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05. Donor, recipient country and year fixed effects included (not reported). Standard errors clustered at donor-recipient pair.
